US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, and Publications
4-1-2015

Strengthening Statehood Capabilities for Successful Transitions
in the Middle East / North Africa Region
Mohammed El-Katiri Dr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
El-Katiri, Mohammed Dr., "Strengthening Statehood Capabilities for Successful Transitions in the Middle
East / North Africa Region" (2015). Monographs, Books, and Publications. 459.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/459

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, and Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

The United States Army War College
The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service
at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application
of Landpower.
The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates
who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently,
it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders
and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage
in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving
national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national
security and strategic research and analysis to influence
policy debate and bridge the gap between military
and academia.

CENTER for
STRATEGIC
LEADERSHIP and
DEVELOPMENT

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

The Center for Strategic Leadership and Development
contributes to the education of world class senior
leaders, develops expert knowledge, and provides
solutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national
security community.
The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
provides subject matter expertise, technical review,
and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability
operations concepts and doctrines.

U.S. Army War College

SLDR

Senior Leader Development and Resiliency

The Senior Leader Development and Resiliency program
supports the United States Army War College’s lines of
effort to educate strategic leaders and provide well-being
education and support by developing self-awareness
through leader feedback and leader resiliency.
The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic
leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom
grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and
by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in
the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional
expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security,
resource management, and responsible command.
The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires,
conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use
to support the U.S. Army, educate an international
audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

STRATEGIC
STUDIES
INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War
College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related
to national security and military strategy with emphasis on
geostrategic analysis.
The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic
studies that develop policy recommendations on:
• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined
employment of military forces;
• Regional strategic appraisals;
• The nature of land warfare;
• Matters affecting the Army’s future;
• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,
• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.
Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern
topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of
Defense, and the larger national security community.
In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics
of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings
of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip
reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.
The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the
Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army
participation in national security policy formulation.
i

Strategic Studies Institute
and
U.S. Army War College Press

STRENGTHENING STATEHOOD
CAPABILITIES FOR
SUCCESSFUL TRANSITIONS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA REGION

Mohammed El-Katiri
April 2015
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and
U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full
academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified
information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent
official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to
offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for
public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code,
Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be
copyrighted.

iii

*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should
be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn
Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.
*****
This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War
College External Research Associates Program. Information on
this program is available on our website, www.StrategicStudies
Institute.army.mil, at the Opportunities tab.
*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War
College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free
of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may
also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing
an order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quoted
or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate
credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.
Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address:
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
*****
The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War
College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update
the national security community on the research of our analysts,
recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides
a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you
are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the
SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ISBN 1-58487-671-9

iv

FOREWORD
The political transitions that followed revolutions
in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia are by no means complete. They have gone through challenging phases,
characterized by political volatility and tension. These
challenges and uncertainties have a profound impact on the three countries’ economies and the ability of their new political elites to build credibility and
political legitimacy.
Each of the three countries studied in this monograph has followed a distinct path, with its own opportunities and limitations. Policy reforms during
each transition have reflected individual political,
security, and social realities. However, one common
lesson learned from their trajectories is that their challenges are exacerbated by a deficit of human and institutional capabilities to design and implement political
and economic reforms.
In this monograph, Dr. El-Katiri focuses on the
variety of challenges that face reform attempts in the
post revolution Arab countries. He examines underlying factors that have prevented new political elites
and post-revolution institutions from successfully implementing essential reforms, and how these failures
have affected the building of their political legitimacy.
He concludes with a series of specific policy recommendations, with the aim of preventing further deterioration to the detriment of U.S. interests.
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The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this analysis to provide readers with information for
further debate on this topic.
			
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Despite achievements made during the past 4
years since Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya overthrew their
former dictatorial rulers, these societies still face major
governance, security, and economic challenges. These
challenges vary from country to country depending
on their specific circumstances, including the intensity and duration of the uprising, and the prevailing
economic and political situations before and after the
upheaval. Libya’s security and political situation in
particular remain chaotic. Very limited progress has
been made on rebuilding basic state institutions or
solving legal problems related to restoring justice for
individuals and communities.
The inability of the new political elites to meet the
political and economic expectations of their populations has undermined their political legitimacy which
has had a significant impact on a variety of economic
sectors in all three countries, and on their public finances. For instance, Tunisia’s and Egypt’s public
finances have significantly worsened over the last 4
years, resulting in large fiscal deficits. Lack of financial
resources has limited the ability of both countries to
tackle the structural problems of their economies.
However, failures to implement reforms and resolve socio-economic problems cannot be attributed
solely to lack of financial resources. The capacity of
post-revolution political elites and institutions was
constrained by a skills deficit among bureaucratic
cadres. Politicians and civil servants have had to
learn from scratch the complexity of the challenges
that face their societies in the post-conflict era, in economic recovery, justice, security, and more. The new
era requires innovative thinking to address economic
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difficulties, draft new legislation, and establish new
institutions.
This monograph assesses the post-revolution challenges faced by these three countries, and measures
progress made in reaching them. It reviews their implications for the broader region and for U.S. interests,
and makes a number of policy recommendations for
U.S. decisionmakers.

x

STRENGTHENING STATEHOOD
CAPABILITIES FOR
SUCCESSFUL TRANSITIONS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA REGION
INTRODUCTION
Political transitions that follow revolutions or wars
are inevitably challenging phases, characterized by
political volatility and tensions. Transitions are periods that require the rebuilding of important political
institutions and skillful handling of a variety of acute
political, security and socio-economic challenges.
Transitions are also phases that often entail the reform
of security apparatuses, reform of the justice system,
writing new or introducing substantial amendments
to existing constitutions, and in some instances the
re-engineering of the state governance system with
the establishment of new structures to ensure the distribution of political power and wealth. On the economic side, governments have to launch policies to
foster economic growth and regain the trust of local
and international investors. It is a complex and long
process. In addition, these policy areas often have to
be tackled simultaneously, given their interconnectedness, particularly at a time when popular expectations
are high and every move of the government is under
intense scrutiny.
Several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have experienced all of these multiple challenges since 2011, following the overthrow of
Arab leaders who had ruled their respective countries
for decades. The triumph of protests in Tunisia and
Egypt, deposing Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni
Mubarak, inspired other popular revolts to force
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their authoritarian rulers out in Libya and Yemen,
or to achieve greater political concessions in Algeria
and Morocco.
This monograph takes the case studies of Egypt,
Tunisia, and Libya to examine the scope for ensuring successful political transitions in the MENA region’s current unsettled state. The post-revolution
political elites in these three countries are struggling
to strengthen their legitimacy in the eyes of the public, and their attempts to gather support for the new
political institutions and reforms have made limited
progress. Despite their aspirations, the past 4 years
have been characterized by political volatility and
continuous instability.
Rebuilding challenges differ from one country to
another according to individual circumstances. Specific needs depend on the intensity and duration of
the uprising, and the prevailing economic and political situations before and after the main upheaval. For
instance, Libya, a country that experienced approximately 6 months of civil war, had the urgent matter of
returning and restoring justice to displaced communities and individuals. The war caused massive displacement of communities and residents of cities both
within Libya and abroad. Furthermore, in the specific
case of Libya, the fall of the Qadhafi regime left the
country without functioning security institutions but
with dozens of rival armed groups, and politics and
security thus became intertwined. In Egypt and Tunisia, the popular revolts were violent but did not escalate into civil war, and internal security has remained
in the hands and under the control of the Ministries of
Defense and of the Interior in both countries.
Addressing these challenges requires a wide range
of skills, knowledge, institutional capacity, and coor-
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dination abilities at top echelons of government. These
requirements hardly exist in any of the three countries
analyzed in this article at this point in time. The rebuilding tasks are beyond their capacities alone, and
experience of previous international transitions that
followed conflict or revolutions shows that external
assistance is essential. But at the same time, international aid has been reduced by the austerity policies in
place in most developed economies. The cuts in government budgets across Western countries are affecting their willingness and ability to provide economic
development, justice, and security assistance in places
that need it most.
This monograph does not aim to offer a comparative analysis between the three countries, but rather
looks at their different trajectories in the ongoing
transitional phase to build new political institutions
and governance. The research builds on the author’s
working experience with officials and academics from
the region within a range of training and capacitybuilding projects.
The first section will focus on why reforms are an
inherent part of development in the post-revolution
Arab countries. The second section looks at different
reform attempts in key areas initiated over the past 3
years which have failed to make any successful progress. The third section examines a range of factors that
constrained progress on a number of reform projects
across the three countries, and notes that the weaknesses of these governments cannot only be attributed to the current political context, but are instead an
outcome of decades of bad staffing and recruitment
in both the public and private sectors. The fourth
section argues that capability building needs differ
greatly between the three countries, and that tailored
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responses are required based on a thorough assessment of these needs.
THE LOGIC OF REFORM IN TRANSITION
The upheavals that swept the MENA region after
December 2010 were driven by an irrepressible desire
for change in both the political and economic spheres
and the restoration of justice. Millions across the Arab
countries protested against rampant corruption, unfair economic conditions, and the lack of political freedoms and dignity. The calls for the departure of their
respective leaders or regimes were a reflection of a desire for a prosperous future within inclusive economic
and political systems. Thus, the new political elites
and institutions had limited choice but to be responsive to the demands and aspirations of the broad base
of their populations and adopt ambitious reforms.
Each of the three countries described here has had
its distinct path, opportunities, and limitations. Policy
reforms during their transitions have reflected individual political, security, and social realities. While
there was indisputable regime change in the case of
Libya, the other two countries have seen more nuanced political scenarios. The 2011 revolutions in
Egypt and Tunisia saw the ousting of key political
figures and the fall of governments, but did not result
in an uprooting of regimes. In both countries, the security apparatus that was an important pillar of the
ousted regimes remained unchanged. The dismissing
of senior officials in Tunisia did not result in a substantial change of loyalties, beliefs, and modi operandi of
the security organizations.1 These organizations and
their unofficial affiliations with established business
networks constitute what became commonly known

4

as the “deep state,” which has shaped political events
during the transition. Although they were not perfect
democracies, both of these countries had political parties and established bureaucracies, with levels of efficiency which were acceptable by regional standards.
Libya, by contrast, represents a more complex
and difficult environment. The country is plagued by
continuous instability, and interim governments have
lacked the capacity or commitment to exercise leadership in developing state institutions. Lack of qualified personnel in what is left of the Libyan bureaucracy, and a limited academic environment, constrain
rapid and effective progress in the rebuilding of state
institutions.
Legitimacy and Constitution-Building.
The post-armed conflict or post-revolution governments of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya are confronted with
a range of challenges which must be addressed in order to build their legitimacy and overcome the sequelae
of the instability that led to the political upheaval in
the first place. This crucial transitional political phase
requires the enactment of a variety of new laws and
establishment of new institutions to deal with tasks
which are specific to this period. This has been evident
in all three countries, where the new governments
have enacted new electoral laws and established special-purpose institutions to draft a new constitution,
organize and oversee elections, or introduce reforms.
Once constitutions are promulgated, parliaments and
governments tend to establish a variety of structures
and institutions to implement the constitutional provisions, and this undertaking in turn implies the design
and regulation of further new institutional structures.
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Scholars of post-conflict societies deem the rewriting of the constitution to be an important step in laying the foundation for the country’s democratic transition to accountability, inclusive political participation,
rule of law, and protection of human rights. Thus, all
changes of government in the Arab countries over the
last 4 years have dictated either the drafting of a new
constitution where it has never existed, as was the
case with Libya, or introducing substantial amendments to the existing ones in the cases of Tunisia
and Egypt.
The announcement of the drafting of a new constitution is regarded as a declaration by the new political
elites of their intent to enshrine the protection of human rights, democracy, and rule of law principles and
institutions. In the absence of a constitution, the interim Libyan National Transitional Council promulgated
a Constitutional Declaration in August 2011, setting
the governance structure for the transition phase until
a new constitution is drafted.2
Drafting a new constitution is deemed paramount
to building the credibility and legitimacy of new
governments, and thus deserves to be prioritized.
The drafting of a constitution is not an easy task in
post-revolution or post-regime change contexts. It is
a process that requires not only skillful handling of
the content and wording of the constitution, but also
deft management of the process. It is usually an undertaking that is fraught with risks and challenges, especially in a transition period characterized by weak
political legitimacy and fierce completion among a variety of political groups. This too has been evident in
the cases of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. For instance, in
Tunisia, which led the political upheaval in the Arab
world, it took the National Constituent Assembly 2
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years and 3 months to complete the drafting of the
new constitution which was approved on January 26,
2014. The process of deliberation was neither smooth
nor without controversy. The divergence of views
between Islamist and secular parties on a variety of
issues reached the level of political crisis on several
occasions. The position of religion in political life has
been one of the most controversial matters in all three
countries, and one that has generated vigorous political debates within the constituent bodies and outside
among political parties and civil society.3 However,
the legal debate has to some extent only mirrored the
competition in the political arena among political parties, and the limited trust they have in each other.4 The
debates, despite the tensions they sparked, provided
opportunities to deepen understanding of a variety
of ideals and what they mean to different social and
ideological groups within Tunisia.
The drafting of Egypt’s constitution under the
Muslim Brotherhood’s rule was not without controversy either. Secular and leftist forces protested the
dominant position Egyptian Islamists have in the
Constituent Assembly, with their fears centered on
the role of Islamic law, Sharia, as source of legislation.5 In Libya, the unfortunate position society found
itself in with weak or no vital state institutions, and
no constitution or constitutional culture among its
intelligentsia, complicated progress on drafting the
constitution. The process of preparing the country’s
first constitution since the end of monarchy in 1969 became the victim of the political and security chaos that
has dominated Libya over the last 4 years.6 The power
struggle between different ideological, regional, and
ethnic armed groups hampered the process of electing
a constituent assembly. The General National Con-
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gress and different post-Qadhafi governments had to
balance competing demands on the representation issue from ethnic minorities such as Amazigh, Touareg,
and Tabu, as well as regions, secularists, and Islamists.
The process of drafting is still at an early stage since 60
members of the constituent assembly were elected in
February 2014.
The drafters of constitutions have to deal with a
variety of vital themes ranging from identity matters
to the organization of the state structure and the status
of its vital political and economic institutions. For example, vital themes that are usually discussed include,
but are not limited to, the change from a centralized to
a federal state system, the structure and size of parliament, and the judiciary governance system. This is
a fundamental project that requires careful study of
each of the options and thorough discussion.
Moving away from political aspects associated
with constitution making, the process requires the
availability of a wide range of resources and skills.
Experts usually look at experiences of other countries
that have gone through similar transitions and political transformations. But not all of these countries
have had access to technical expertise, or were well
informed about comparative constitutional literature
and experiences.
Restructuring the Security Sector.
Another fundamental area of reconstruction is reform of the security sector. The impetus and extent
for reforming the security apparatus in post-regime
change differs from one country to another. In some
countries, the main driver is to remove remnants of
the previous regime, either because of the fear of loy-
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alty to the ousted regime or because of their involvement in abuses of human rights. In others, the reform
is driven by a desire to change the culture of their institutions and subject them to more accountability and
civilian oversight, which is an important condition for
the transition to more representative political systems.
In most cases, these reforms are responsive to popular demands, particularly where these security agencies have been the most visible and detested manifestation of the old authoritarian regimes. This is the case
in the three countries studied in this monograph; the
security agencies were involved for decades in a variety of repressive policies and events.
Thus, part of the reform entails the adoption of
regulations and other measures to introduce mechanisms for oversight of security organizations by the
government and parliament or judiciary, as well as
the provision of training to existing forces to change
their working practices in line with the new accountability and respect for human rights. Other parts of
the restructuring, discussed further, involve strengthening their capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively
to deal effectively with a range of threats.
Once again, the needs for reform differ across the
three countries, depending on the political and security circumstances of each state. Libya remains an
extreme case. The fall of the Qadhafi regime was accompanied by the fall of the state security institutions.
The current government security institutions lack the
capability to maintain order, protect citizens and the
country’s borders, and critical facilities. The security
landscape is further complicated by the existence of a
variety of rival well-armed groups, which emerged as
a result of the circumstances of the 2011 war. As predicted in an earlier monograph,7 most military arse-
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nals inherited from the Qadhafi regime and the subsequent civil war remain in their hands.8 Thus, security
sector reform in Libya entails not only the formation
of new professional security institutions that are not
based on regional, tribal, or ethnic allegiances, but
also must include plans to demilitarize armed groups
and help the reinsertion of combatants into civilian
and security institutions. In fact, this has been a priority for the interim Libya governments since late 2011.
The picture is less complicated in Egypt and Tunisia. Both countries have strong and functioning security apparatuses, with Egypt having the largest armed
forces by number of personnel in the Arab world.
Their main motivation is primarily a desire to restore
the loss of credibility of the security forces in the eyes
of the public. Thus, the main objective is to focus on
strengthening governance and respect of human
rights. In Egypt, the ideal main goal of reform would
be to ensure gradual disengagement of the military
from politics and economy. Over the last 6 decades,
since the military coup in 1952 that saw the ousting of
King Farouk, the military has expanded and consolidated its position in both the politics and the economy
of Egypt.9 Egyptian presidents since that time have
been military officers, including Mubarak. In Egypt,
there is no civilian oversight over the management of
defense affairs, and the Ministry of Defense is run by
the military. Meanwhile in Tunisia, the reform of the
Ministry of Interior’s security agencies is seen as an
integral part of the wider democratic transition strategy. During the Ben Ali era, different security agencies
which fell under the umbrella of the Ministry of Interior were involved in assassination, torture, and other
maltreatment for years. The reputation of the police
and security forces deteriorated still further as a result
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of its brutality in quelling protests that led to the departure of Ben Ali, as well as during subsequent protests after January 2011.10 The gathering of thousands
of Tunisian protestors at the time outside the Ministry
headquarters in Tunis evidenced how it epitomized
regime oppression.11
Given the vital role these security agencies play
in the functioning of the state and its stability, reform
decisions are deemed delicate, and they are rarely
launched immediately in the aftermath of a government change. The new political elites might immediately signal the need to rehabilitate the security
agencies, but leave any substantial reforms to later
stage. Once launched, the reform process tends to be
gradual. Pursuing deep reform at an early stage and
in a comprehensive way runs the risk of demoralizing
and alienating security officers and officials, and their
political backers. Furthermore, any attempt to revisit
the injustices caused by the security agencies over the
years endangers the stability of the political transition.
Economic Reform.
Socio-economic grievances played an important
role in sparking the revolutions in these three countries. But the economic situation has deteriorated still
further since December 2010. The troubled political
transitions, characterized by demonstrations and security disorders, have caused significant economic
losses and have brought the economies and public
finances of Egypt and Tunisia near to collapse. Instability has affected economic growth, discouraged direct investors, and led to substantial falls in foreign
reserves and the rise of budget deficits. In Libya, the
19th largest oil producer in the world, the picture is no
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different. Oil exports were halted for months during
the continued insecurity and thus deprived the Libyan state of its main source of revenues. Oil production
and export facilities became the targets of armed rebel
groups in their dispute with the Libyan government.
The situation remains fluid as the intertwined security
and political tensions remain unresolved.
It is unsurprising that the post-revolution governments have opted for a set of policy reforms that attempted to revive the economy, improve the delivery
of basic services to their population, and tackle issues
of income inequality and regional development disparities. In order to placate public discontent and mark
the start of a new political era, interim governments in
Tunisia and Egypt introduced measures to promote
youth employment and maintained subsidies for food
and energy products.
In addition, the interim rulers in the three countries
launched initiatives to track billions of dollars stolen
by the deposed rulers, their families, and entourage.12
These initiatives were deemed important for strengthening values of democracy and morality, as well as
consolidating trust through demonstration of the discontinuity between the new rulers and deposed ones.
The recovery of illegal assets has been prioritized because of its economic significance, particularly in the
case of Egypt and Tunisia where the need for funds to
shore up dwindling public finances, and the countries’
foreign currencies reserves is huge and immediate.
LIMITED SUCCESS IN DEALING
WITH CHALLENGES
The political transition that followed the overthrow of the rulers in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia is still
unfinished. No strong and legitimate government or
12

leader has emerged in any of the three countries. The
mere fact of holding a number of elections to choose
temporary institutions to handle the transition has not
led to any significant progress. The post-2011 governments have not yet consolidated their stance on the
political scene. The three countries have not had stable
governments; either there has been a major reshuffle
or an entire change of government as happened in
Egypt. Even Tunisia, which has been less politically
turbulent compared to Egypt and Libya, experienced
a severe political crisis that started early in 2013 and
lasted for months. The source of tension was ideological between the ruling Islamist Ennahda party and its
secular opposition. In December 2013, after monthslong arduous negotiations, a new apolitical government was announced.13
In Egypt, the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in
the 2012 legislative and presidential elections did not
yield any political stability. On the contrary, the tussle
between the remnants of Mubarak regime, mainly
from the security apparatus, and the ruling Islamists
escalated and led to a military-backed coup in June
2013.14 The ousting of the elected president, Mohamed
Morsi, inaugurated a new phase of unrest that has not
yet settled despite the organization of new presidential elections,15 which resulted in the election of a retired Field Marshal Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. At the time of
this writing, sporadic clashes between Muslim Brotherhood supporters and Egyptian forces of order are
still taking place.
Libya’s transition has seen dramatic cycles of political instability. Since the fall of the former regime,
Libya has descended into an era of deep ideological,
tribal, and regional tensions and continuous security
threats. Following the ousting of the elected Libyan
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Prime Minister Ali Zeidan in March 2014, Libya entered a further period of institutional uncertainty that
lasted for months. The election of Ahmed Maiteeg as
successor was deemed unconstitutional by Libyan liberal political parties and their supporters, and led to
a power rivalry between him and caretaker Abdullah
al-Thini, who took office temporarily after Zeidan.16
Insecurity continues to prevail on the ground, with
persistent clashes between a variety of armed groups
and the assassination of security officers and targeting of politicians. The military operation initiated by
renegade general Khalifa Haftar since mid-May 2014,
with the advertised aim of defeating extremist groups
and bringing stability, has further worsened the security situation and spread the fighting from Benghazi
to Western parts of Libya, including Tripoli.17 After
months of fighting, Khaifa Haftar’s military coalition
has lost several battles and with them the control of
Tripoli and Benghazi in August 2014, which are now
controlled by Misrata-led forces and Islamists, respectively. At the time of this writing, the country continues to be unstable as fights between Khalifa Haftar’s
forces and their adversaries have not ceased. The current military polarization is also reflected in the political realm. Libya again entered a period of political
confusion in August 2014. The country now has two
parliaments, one in the eastern city of Tobruk and
another one in Tripoli, and each has named its own
prime minister.18
What these political events reflect is the inability of
the new political elites to win the trust of the great majority of their populations, or to engineer an inclusive
transitional political process that enables different
political parties to work together. To cultivate trust,
the leaderships should articulate the aspirations of the
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people and the interests of key political stakeholders.
This political element is vital for successful and peaceful transitions. But it is not the only factor. New governments also have to meet socio-economic goals. The
change of regimes has to result in betterment of the
lives of citizens in a sustainable way.
Limited Tangible Deliverables.
The failures in rebuilding trust come as a result
of limited success in improving the delivery of basic
services. Over the last 3 years, no long-term policy
has been launched to deal with the many structural
challenges facing these countries. Their governments
have been predominantly in fire-fighting mode, reacting to crises and not proactively launching policies to
consolidate different aspects of their economies, particularly in areas with potentially major economic and
political impact. No policies to reform health services,
provide affordable housing, or tackle unemployment
have been announced. There is a lack of any detailed
plan to create new industries and strengthen their
economic diversification, or amend energy and food
subsidy systems to consolidate fiscal balances.
The opposite has happened; most of the programs
announced have been short term, indicating a deficit
of vision among the new leaders. The few populist
initiatives which were adopted caused other secondary effects. In the absence of any structural plans, the
governments resorted to increasing public spending
to placate popular anger. For instance, the decision
of the Tunisian government to increase the number
of public sector jobs to absorb the number of unemployed graduates did not provide a structural solution to the unemployment issue. The Tunisian gov-
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ernment created 34,000 jobs in public service and
state-owned companies, an equivalent of fewer than
5 percent of the total unemployed.19 Meanwhile, these
new appointments have added more pressure on the
public finances.
Surprisingly, even in countries with a record of remarkable economic reforms such as Tunisia, the pace
has slowed down. This is mainly attributed to the focus
of the leadership on elections and constitutions. During this period, Tunisia experienced a high turnover
of senior civil servants in key ministries and public
owned companies. After government reshuffles, new
ministers have tended to appoint their trustees in key
ministerial departments and public companies.20 The
constant replacements have impacted the capacity of
bureaucracy to elaborate and implement complex reforms. These shortcomings have fed into the worries
of international investors and lending organizations,
and constrained the flow of international capital into
Tunisia which has further complicated the country’s
economic situation.
Transitional Justice.
The establishment of transitional justice for past
violations of human rights is important for building
trust between the people and the state, as well as for
strengthening the social fabric of the three transition
countries. Transitional justice, in fact, has become one
of the key demands of civil societies in the aftermath
of 2011 revolutions for crimes that happened during
the rule of ousted leaders or afterwards during the
transition, particularly in Libya and Egypt. However,
implementation has suffered from lack of capabilities
and excessive politicization. In Libya, the National
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Transitional Council (NTC), acting under the influence of the revolutionary fervor of its own people
and idealist advice of international human rights
donors, enacted several regulations to tackle human
rights abuses committed under the former regime and
during the 2011 war. In 2011, the NTC enacted law
17/2011, establishing a Fact Finding and Reconciliation Commission, a body with a mission to investigate
human rights crimes but no mandate to punish them.
In May 2012, NTC issued Law 38, granting amnesty
to revolutionaries who had committed criminal acts
which were dictated by the circumstances of the 2011
war.21 This law attracted criticism from international
human rights organizations and experts as giving a
blanket amnesty to all criminals, including perpetuators of crimes against humanity and war crimes.22
The enactment of these two laws highlights two
main shortcomings. First, it showed an absolute miscomprehension of the sensitivity of such political initiatives and the conditions that they require for success.
The implementation of a mechanism of transitional
justice in a political context characterized by continuing tensions among a variety of regional and ideological rival groups could further exacerbate conflict. The
laws were enacted in the absence of even basic state
institutions to oversee and enforce their application.
Second, these laws were criticized for being incomplete and lacking specific elements for its application.
For instance, Law 17/2011 did not specify the period
and type of crimes to be covered by the Commission’s
investigation work. Article 1 of the law opted for an
elastic approach by stating that the investigation will
cover all infringements of human rights. The commission also lacked the equipment and skilled officials to conduct its mission, such as forensic experts
and materials.
17

The laws were adopted with no accompanying
strategy to update the country’s criminal code and
procedures to be able to deal with war crimes, or to
provide training to the Libyan judges and prosecutors, most of whom lacked any knowledge or experience of how to deal with the atrocities of the previous
regime.23 Given these shortcomings, the Libyan government, with the assistance of subject-matter experts
and international organizations, had to issue a new
comprehensive law which was promulgated by the
General National Congress in December 2013. Law
29/2013, on transitional justice, abrogated the previous texts and established a new Fact Finding Commission with a specific mandate, and detailed regulation of its functioning and relations with other state
institutions.24
The promulgation of the Political Exclusion Law
in May 2013, which disqualifies officials and officers
who served under the former regime from playing
any role in the new political and public institutions,
is another example of chaotic approach to transitional
justice adopted by Libyan interim governments.25 The
law disqualifies all people associated with former regime, even if they did not commit any criminal act
while serving under Qadhafi rule. The exclusion of
the process from any judicial review undermines efforts to build a new political regime that is based on
rule of law. The law was unpopular not only among
the former civil servants who are affected by it, but
also among civil society and political activists. This
lustration has undermined what is already a fragile
political scene, and is depriving the state of thousands
of experienced professionals such as the military
officers, ministers, and judges.26
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Disarmament and Reintegration of Militias.
Another vital policy area that has failed to achieve
its main goals is the disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration (DDR) of Libyan rebels. The DDR
program was badly designed and executed, leading
to a debacle which has contributed to the continuing
instability in Libya. The Libyan authorities, with their
international advisors, lacked detailed mapping of the
ideological, political, and economic motives of different armed militias. The planning process did not pay
attention to the difficult context in which some of their
programs would be implemented. As a result, the efforts of the Commission for Warriors’ Affairs (CWA)
to reintegrate rebels into civilian life or in the police
and defense forces achieved limited success. A considerable number of large militias and their members did
not join the DDR programs. They are still unwilling
to hand over their weapons or enroll into official state
security structures. The incentives and programs for
reintegration have simply not been attractive, or even
suitable for the majority of rebels.
Besides pursuing political goals, large militias are
generating substantial income for themselves from
the provision of protection to state-owned and private
assets. Some are involved in the smuggling of goods,
drugs, weapons, and people across neighboring borders. In some ways, the formation of a national army
and police forces are able to provide security across
the Libyan cities and regions, as well as protect its borders, would be contrary to their interests. This also explains a series of murders and assassination attempts
against key senior military officers struggling to build
a national army. The lack of a diversified or functioning economy that is able to offer real employment
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opportunities has also impeded sustainable reintegration of ex-fighters into civil life. With the scarcity of
employment opportunities, it is likely that some beneficiaries of the reintegration program will eventually
be recruited back into armed militias.
The absence of well-paid job opportunities offered
by the private sector has further limited the ability of
the Libyan authorities to convince rebels to hand over
their weapons. The education level of many rebels
does not qualify them to take over civil service jobs
or work in state-owned companies, but those jobs in
the private sector which do not require a high level
of skill are filled by foreign workers. The government
remains the main employer of Libyan nationals, and
there is a limit to what it can absorb.
Programs to promote entrepreneurship among
armed militiamen, through the provision of training
and funds to create micro and small enterprises, were
doomed to fail because of continued violence and the
absence of a suitable business environment. One of
the few successful programs launched by CWA has
been a scholarship program for post-graduate studies
abroad, which is intended to benefit 18,000 ex-fighters
by 2015.27
ROOTS OF TRANSITION DEBACLES
The transition phase in the three countries has
been characterized by fragility, which hampered
progress on a variety of essential reforms. This was a
period marked by intense political jockeying between
different parties over power, and the type and scope
of possible reform. The new leaderships have been
confronted with a complex chessboard to manage in
order to avoid a return to violent instability, or at least
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mitigate its intensity when it arrives. The three countries have gone through periods of violent riots, assassinations, and terrorist attacks to varying degrees.
The tense political environment has diverted valuable
resources and distracted attention from much-needed reforms and institutional rebuilding initiatives.
Naturally, the more politically sensitive reforms are
even more influenced by the power balance between
political stakeholders.
The difficulty of implementing police reform in
Egypt during the Muslim Brotherhood rule is a case in
point. Attempts at gradual reform of the police forces
were faced with resistance from officers. In early-2013,
hundreds of police forces went on strike in different
Egyptian cities, asking for the ousting of Interior Minister Muhammad Ibrahim and his appointees in the
Ministry of Interior.28 Meanwhile, in Libya, the unsettled security and political situation has influenced the
pace of rebuilding the country’s armed forces as well
as limiting the type of schemes which can be adopted
to achieve this goal. The Libyan authorities have tried
a range of approaches, from co-opting armed militias
through paying them wages from the Ministries of
Defense and Interior, to creating new security institutions and sending their recruits for training abroad.
Even the training of defense forces in several North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states,
which was the subject of high hopes, is expected to
make limited change despite all efforts to harmonize
the training program among the host NATO partners.
Ana Gomez, European Parliament Standing Rapporteur for Libya, observed after her visit to Tripoli
during the first week of October 2013:
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The rebuilding of capable armed forces and police
in Libya requires a sustained and coordinated international effort of assistance that will demand several
years and commitment from Libya and its partners.
That assistance requires training of forces in the country and not just token offers of training abroad, as offered by some EU MS [member states].29

The outcome of this hybrid strategy was a disappointing failure, and came at a high cost for Libyan
elected politicians in terms of financial costs and credibility.30 The incapacity of the government was palpable when it failed in November 2013 to respond to citizens’ demands to force or negotiate a retreat of armed
militias. Tripoli then witnessed general strikes and
daily marches of Libyan citizens calling for the government’s military and police to take over the security
of the capital.31 The difficulty the Libyan government
experiences in trying to mobilize what military forces
are left is due to the politicization of the military command. Senior Libyan generals have taken sides in the
power tussle between Islamist and non-Islamist actors
in the parliament and government.
Difficulties in Political Crisis-Management.
Lack of progress cannot, however, be attributed
only to fragile political and security factors; other influencing factors have been in play. Lack of knowledge and experience among the new political leaders
in dealing with the complications of transition, and a
shortage of experienced professionals and financial
resources remain the main drivers of difficult and disorderly political trajectories.
The course of events over the last 4 years shows
that these societies were institutionally unprepared
22

to deal with sudden and complex change. The largely
unplanned protests and ousting of presidents took
everyone by surprise, both in the MENA region and
internationally. The protests were driven mainly by
youth and without any ideological underpinning. The
interim and newly-elected governments had no plans
and no understanding of how to deal with a sudden
change of the political scene, with all the specific challenges that comes with it. The situation was further
complicated by a dearth of think tanks or academia
to provide intellectual assistance and professional advice on developing a vision to govern the transition or
refine some of its key elements.
The deposed ruling elites lacked detailed contingency plans to deal with some of the political challenges that Egypt and Tunisia faced after their revolutions and Libya after its civil war in 2011, such as
constitutional changes and economic reforms to
strengthen budget balances and ensure better distribution of wealth. Even if such plans existed, they
were likely kept in the possession of a tight circle of
trusted collaborators in Egypt and Tunisia. This was
certainly the case in Libya, where the ideas for political and economic reforms which were promoted by
Qadhafi’s son, Seif Al-Islam, were unlikely to have
reached a comprehensive or advanced stage.32 The
newly elected Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia
had no experience of being in power and were not
acquainted with the subtleties of governing a state.
In many instances they were not able to evaluate the
advice they received from international organizations
and consultants related to post-conflict issues.
Neither did history provide guidance to the current rulers in tackling the challenges they are facing. After independence from European colonialism,
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the political leaders of these countries had certainly
overcome hurdles to assert their leadership and build
their state institutions, but the political and security
environments in which this was achieved were far less
complex than those of today. Political elites then did
not have to act in an environment dominated by the
internet, social media, and rising popular expectations
that are difficult to meet.
The lack of experience was manifested in the reluctance of governments to initiate reforms. In some instances, the politicians’ insecurity was reflected in not
making decisions. In many instances, their reactions
were the opposite of what the times of extraordinary
crisis, in fact, required. This was the predicament of
elected Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, who was
widely considered weak and lacking charisma to assert his authority.33 Successful transition requires a decisive and strong government to push through difficult
reforms and attempt to break up vested interests. All
the previously mentioned limitations constrained the
performance of these post-revolution governments,
and their ability to rebuild a new political order and
meet the expectations of their voters.
Insufficient progress during transition cannot be
attributed solely to elected ministers; instead, it reflects a wider failure to develop quality human capital over previous decades. This issue also concerns
other elements of these MENA societies. The shortage
of talented bureaucrats, professionals, and businessmen remains the main constraint that has limited the
ability of the new political leadership to design new
economic and political governance, in a context that
is characterized by political volatility. Presidential
and ministerial cabinets did not have well-established
experts with the skills and experience to develop and
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oversee the implementation of strategies in a variety
of policy areas, including in primary areas such as
economic and foreign policy.
It goes without saying that the quality of the economic and bureaucratic intelligentsia remains a decisive factor that determines the success of a transition country in adapting to and shaping challenging
events. But those qualified and experienced individuals who might have been able to advise new governments had generally been ousted as part of each new
government’s policy to cut out key figures from former regimes. The parallel option of drawing more
on qualified nationals in academia, industry, or from
abroad, is typically not used either, as the decades of
closed-circle political elitist culture in these countries
renders the outreach to a skilled citizenry intrinsically
difficult even for new political parties. With typically
no existing expertise of their own within the government’s underlying bureaucratic layers, these newly
elected governments hence took office armed with
little more than vaguely formulated goals of doing everything differently from the previous regimes, and
little practical planning and implementation capacity.
Learning Politics from Scratch.
The post-revolution and war eras have showed a
deficit in the skills of the bureaucracy cadres across the
region. Politicians and civil servants have had to learn
from scratch the complexity of challenges that face
their societies in a post-conflict era in areas of economic recovery, justice, and security. The new era requires
new legislations to tackle issues of transitional justice,
the drafting and negotiations of constitutions, and
training for judges to deal with crimes that were com-
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mitted in the very special circumstances of civil war.
It requires innovative thinking to address economic
difficulties. In Libya, for instance, judges investigating human rights violations were constrained by lack
of legal texts, and most importantly lack of experience
of how to deal with such cases either as prosecutors or
judges. Another example is the lack of procedures or
expertise for tracing the wealth and properties of former rulers in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. After the fall
of the three regimes in 2011, investigators were constrained by their lack of experience in understanding
complex legal and financial structures in international
investments.34
Furthermore, there are other causes that are structural and emanate from decades of poor management
of human capital, nepotism, and corruption. The failure of education systems to provide young generations with skills or entrepreneurial abilities relevant
to the labor market has jeopardized attempts to placate public anger. There are variations in population
sizes among the three countries—Egypt is the most
populous country in the Arab world with more than
80 million people—but one shared characteristic is the
large proportion of their citizenry which is made up of
young people. Lack of skills and abilities is preventing
a significant portion of the population from benefiting
from the existing economic opportunities. In countries
like Egypt and Tunisia, for instance, there are plenty
of opportunities for micro and small enterprises in the
tourism and agriculture sectors that have not been
seized by young people.
It follows that when the governments of these
three countries attempt to diversify their economies
into new industries and markets, they will face further constraints. Moving to new industries requires
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specific knowledge and management skills which are
scarce in the current labor market. But it is not only
a lack of specific business education and training
that has led to a deficit of entrepreneurial initiative.
Other challenges which inhibit the creation of new
businesses include an inability to access finance, lack
of business networks, and prohibitively expensive
commercial properties.
Inability to Resolve Structural Economic Problems.
The problems with high youth unemployment in
these countries are significant and will have a persistent impact on their societies’ stability and prosperity, if not addressed. Given that unemployment has
always been an economic challenge in these countries,
the next logical question would be what is different
now. In fact, other socio-economic developments over
the last few years have worsened the situation. First,
the number of unemployed youth with degrees has
increased without any concurrent significant expansion in job opportunities. Second, the role of families
in supporting young members is waning as a consequence of inflationary pressures that have weakened
their abilities to provide assistance. Third, lifestyle
change and the spread of consumerism are adding
more pressures onto the societies of these three countries and widening the gap between rich and poor.
The unavailability to these governments of financial resources to fund development projects and policy reforms has presented a major challenge to their
ambitious reform programs. This is especially the case
for Egypt and Tunisia, which do not have the levels
of revenues enjoyed by neighboring hydrocarbon-rich
countries. The paucity of public finances has hampered

27

their ability to increase wages, maintain subsidies for
basic products, or embark on major infrastructure projects. These states all have urgent needs to launch major economic reforms either to diversify their sources
of energy, or build other physical infrastructures that
are essential to increase the competitiveness of their
economies and to attract more direct investments. But
the large-scale investments that these projects require
are not available locally.
The only available solution is to approach international private and public sources of financing and
create investment and financial schemes on a projectby-project basis. This path does not come without its
political complexities and expenses. The engineering
and negotiation of complex investment and financial schemes is time-consuming, and require highly
skilled experts to manage them on the part of the
governments. The experience of Egypt’s negotiations
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to obtain
a loan of U.S.$4.8 billion illustrates the laboriousness
of dealing with international financiers. At the time of
writing, negotiations have lasted almost 3 years with
no conclusion, as a result of disagreement over conditions proposed by IMF officials who requested a range
of reform measures to reduce the budget deficit, including reduction of subsidies and increased taxation.
Successive Egyptian governments have found the IMF
measures politically nonviable at this fragile political
and economic juncture.35
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SHAPING RESPONSES TO THE
CAPABILITIES CHALLENGE
The three countries have been weakened by the
2011 revolutions and the continuous instability that
has dominated their political scenes since then. The
adverse repercussions of the unstable political and security situation on the economies and fiscal balances
of these countries are now well documented.36 It has
hindered the recovery of tourism in Egypt and Tunisia and led to a significant drop in oil production
and export in Libya. To restore peace and prosperity,
the three countries all need to build trust in their new
governments. This predominantly entails enabling the
different states to perform their vital functions as providers of basic services to their citizens, including the
provision of security and justice, and also to play an
important role in reviving the economy.
There are wide variations in capability deficit between the three countries. Common features that exist
should not mislead us into assuming that their needs
are identical. Each nation has its unique features and
circumstances, and needs vary across the three countries depending on their current levels of political stability, economic development, and political history.
Some countries are in a more precarious situation than
others. For instance, Libya is a country with almost
no functioning state institutions. “One size fits all”
therefore is not a viable approach to deliver successful
capacity-building assistance. No single solution will
fit all these countries or even a specific sector across
the region. Solutions have to be individualized and
tailored to respond to the needs of each country, or
each sector within one country. Thus, there is no substitute for conducting thorough needs assessments for
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each country to identify ways and means to improve
the capabilities of existing institutions and structures,
and to build new ones.
Capabilities development is a broad concept covering a wide range of activities intended to strengthen
the ability of people and organizations in a variety of
sectors across government, private sector, and business to run their affairs effectively. This can be a
complex and lengthy process. This monograph is primarily concerned with the institutions and areas that
are of highest impact on the entire process of institutional rebuilding during transition, and which in the
cases of the three countries under review need to be
prioritized without delay.
Priority for Security.
There may be no area that should be given more
priority than the rebuilding and capability strengthening of the security apparatuses in the three countries
to ensure that order and respect for law are preconditions for any other political and economic reforms.
The post-revolution security landscape within the
three countries has transformed to an extent which
only a handful of analysts previously would have
thought credible.
Tunisia and Egypt remain more stable than Libya
and retain functioning military institutions. But an increased threat of terrorism has been evidenced by an
escalation in attacks, and also an increase in the number of their nationals participating in Jihadist activity
in the Levant and Iraq.
In addition, the deterioration of the situation within Libya, and the inability of the Libyan armed forces
to control the country’s vast borders, have added to
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the security concerns of its neighbors. Spillover has included dramatic expansion in cross-border trafficking
of weapons, humans, and other illicit products. The
proliferation of arms in the border areas has increased
the number of terrorist attacks in Libya’s neighboring countries. The renewal of fighting in July 2014
once again led to destabilizing flows of refugees and
smuggling into Libya’s neighbors. The new wave of
refugees from Libya has become a particular source
of concern to the Tunisian government. The financial
repercussions of the huge influx of refugees, who are
adding further pressure on Tunisia’s public finances,37
have forced the government to call on the international community for economic support to cover the costs
associated with humanitarian assistance, and have
increased demand for subsidized products and pressure on the health sector. Other negative spillovers include damaging the reputation of the country as a safe
destination for tourists and investors.
Instability in Libya currently dominates regional
discussions. Egypt and Tunisia, with other neighboring countries, have held several security meetings at
ministerial levels to discuss appropriate measures to
handle the cross-border security impact. So far, limited progress has been made in formulating a response
to tackle various dimensions of this regional security
problem, including within Libya. To complicate matters further, the North African and Sahel regions’ potentials for mutual security support are undermined
by the continuous disagreement and distrust that
characterize relations between its two most militarily
capable countries, Algeria and Morocco.
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Institution Building.
Another area which requires prioritization is
equipping the three governments, preferably at the
level of prime ministers or presidential cabinets, with
an institutional capability that is able to originate and
develop large-scale development projects. This is a capability that is needed to develop visions and provide
high quality advice and expertise on a variety of governance, security, and economic development matters, as well as oversee the implementation of critical
initiatives for the stability and prosperity of their respective societies. This requires a cadre of well-trained
strategists and diplomats from among existing senior
civil servants who are able to respond to the change
of circumstances within their countries and beyond.
This corps must be able to adapt to the new environments characterized by scarcity of resources and high
competition, and to pursue new avenues to find innovative solutions to pressing social, legal and political
issues, as well as opening new markets and sources of
financing for their economies.
It adds to the misfortunes of these societies that
their transitions come at a time of major shifts in the
world economic and political orders. The developed
world is going through deep economic adjustments
that have affected its ability and willingness to engage in the stabilization and reconstruction of other
countries. Most donors from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries have
adopted austerity budgets which involve significant
spending cuts on international development. There
is a change both of attitude and of perception among
citizens of major donor countries. Public opinion is
less supportive of increased or ineffective spending
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abroad at the same time as cuts reduce the services
offered at home.38
Governments and non-governmental organizations from developed nations at first had shown
readiness to assist Tunisia and Egypt with their political and economic reforms. An initiative baptized the
“Deauville Partnership” was launched in May 2011
during the annual G8 summit held in the French city
of Deauville. The main component of the initiative
was a package of multibillion dollar loans offered to
several Arab countries including Tunisia, Libya, and
Egypt between 2011-13.39
Three years after the launch of the Deauville Partnership, little progress has been made in alleviating
the economic pressures on both the governments and
the peoples of Egypt and Tunisia. One of the criticisms leveled at the international financial institutions
involved in the channeling of these loans concerned
their inability to adapt their procedures to provide innovative ideas that were suited to the specific socioeconomic contexts of the transition countries. The proposed conditions to accompany the loans remained
unchanged from those in place over the previous 3 decades. International financial institutions did provide
funds for major infrastructure projects in electricity
generation, and funds to finance small and medium
enterprises, which will contribute to the long-term
growth of the Egyptian and Tunisian economies. However, there has been a dearth of initiatives launched or
sponsored by these multilateral lending institutions
which are aimed at improving living standards and
reducing social discontent. Greater priority should be
given to reforms that will strengthen the legitimacy
of the government as a provider of services and producer of opportunities to all its citizens, including the
most vulnerable members of society.
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The current situation demands severe rationalization of development expenditure. It follows that improved institutional capability at the top echelons of
power in these countries in transition is all the more
essential, in order to ensure superior coordination of
rebuilding efforts and initiatives at a national level, as
well as to make better use of the limited assistance offered by international development partners. In addition, one of the shortcomings of reconstruction efforts
to date has been a lack of coordination between different policy fields so as to ensure that policy responses
are comprehensive. Improved capacity will thus also
enhance the ability of these governments to embark
on a variety of urgent political and economic reforms
without delay.
CONCLUSIONS
Progress in stabilization, reform, and building new
institutions in the three MENA countries under review has certainly not been spectacular. But while the
political situation remains tense in all three states, the
achievements and debacles vary from one country to
another. Tunisia has made substantial progress on the
political front compared to other countries affected by
the Arab Spring upheavals. But at the same time, there
has been slow progress in addressing the original
economic causes of the upheavals. The political and
economic transition in Egypt remains fragile, and the
new government still has a long way to consolidate its
legitimacy and restore sustainable economic stability.
In Libya, the transition has been chaotic, marked by
continuing conflict among rival armed groups which
has severely impeded the rebuilding of state institutions and the economy and widened dividing lines
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within society, making Libya a country at serious risk
of failure. The renewal of heavy fighting between militias in Tripoli and Benghazi since May 2014 is drawing
the country once more to the brink of civil war.
The needs of these societies are various, complex,
and interdependent. They range from holding elections, rearranging the justice and security sectors,
to reconstructing the economy. Addressing these
tremendous tasks is beyond the capability of a state
alone, even if it had its own ample financial resources.
It follows that efforts to promote post-conflict institutional rebuilding require the collaboration of a range
of different governmental and nongovernmental national and international actors. In other words, for
these countries to build their legitimacy and achieve
sustainable political stability, international partners
must provide assistance to enable the new governments to meet their pressing obligations in the short
term. This is an investment in the future stability of
the entire region.
Trust can dwindle quickly, as has been demonstrated on several occasions over the last 3 years. Failure to
deliver on services and to ensure social justice—which
entails creating employment and fairer distribution
of the country’s wealth—has caused riots in all these
countries. People were demanding immediate solutions to their grievances. In Tunisia, President Moncef
Marzouki has been greeted with the same slogans that
were used during the protests that led to the ousting
of Ben Ali; “get out” or “people want the fall of the regime.” In 2012, the second anniversary of the incident
in the Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid that sparked the
revolution in December 2010 saw residents showing
their anger and disappointment by attacking politicians with tomatoes and stones.40 This incident encap-
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sulated the disenchantment with the slow progress
that Tunisia had experienced almost 2 years after the
ousting of Ben Ali.
The chronic failure of Libya’s elected governments
to build security institutions and exercise effective authority across the entire territory of the nation is affecting the security of the Maghreb and Sahel regions
as a whole. The inability of Libyan government armed
forces to control the country’s borders is unquestionably a threat to the regional stability, not only in the
Maghreb but also beyond. The situation is further
aggravated by the absence of regional cooperation
mechanisms and responses. The Maghreb countries
have not yet managed to build a regional security cooperation forum, partly because of the rivalry between
Algeria and Morocco regarding regional leadership;
but also because, with the exception of Algeria, these
countries have limited human and material resources
to carry out intelligence gathering, border patrols, or
deploy forces into Libya. This is another reason for international partners, in particular the United States, to
maintain and increase engagement with support security sector reform and capability development, in order to reduce further risks of instability and terrorism.
Assisting economic recovery during transition can
be highly effective, and reduce the risk of renewed political chaos. Strong economic growth will bolster the
nascent political elites’ legitimacy by meeting the expectations of a large number of their citizens, and thus
stabilize the country. Linkages between unemployment, political discontent, and instability are well documented, and repeated rioting in all three countries
over the last 3 years occurs when it becomes evident
to the populace that the authorities are unable to meet
their expectations for a dignified standard of living.
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Similarly, a lack of political stability during transitions frequently coincides with a lack of economic
opportunity, which generates a vicious cycle in which
religion, ethnicity, or tribe reassumes a pivotal role in
people’s daily lives as a means of ensuring access to
economic means. The reconstruction of a functioning
private sector has received little attention in the past
3 years from the international community, which has
damaged the ability of these conflict-torn societies to
rebuild the sort of economic stability which would
foster sustainable political stability and peace.
Given the shared interest in maintaining social order and ensuring smooth transitions toward stability
in the region, international and local authorities should
engage in designing public policies that respond to
private sector concerns and encourage investment. It
is essential to understand all factors that hinder the
flow of investments and provide a set of measures
to mitigate these risks and encourage investments in
all sectors, rather than limiting the focus to lucrative
natural resources and physical infrastructure markets.
More attention should be given to the potential of mobilizing the small and medium sized companies that
are currently constrained by lack of resources and expertise. Small and medium sized companies are often
unable to handle the complexities and challenges involved in investing capital in high-risk environments.
This will not only require regulatory and financial
support, but also institutional support to guide and
accompany business investments.
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The MENA region is strategically important to the
United States and developed countries in political,
economic, and security terms. It follows that profound
instability in the region continues to pose a challenge
to U.S. interests in all of these fields. Resolving this
instability requires not only sustained effort and political wisdom from within the region, but also assistance and facilitation from the United States and
other partners.
Stability in the Middle East and North Africa is a
matter that goes beyond the sole competency of the
region’s own states and organizations to deal with; it
is an international matter. The importance of stability and democracy in the region is not only limited
to economic reasons, but also assuring that there are
no radical political forces holding power in the country, including, but not limited to, Islamists. Furthermore, more than one of the countries under discussion
commands a strategically important location in the
Mediterranean.
Strengthening the capabilities of transitional governments and institutions in Arab countries that experienced abrupt change of leadership should continue
to be an important part of U.S. Government engagement in the region. U.S. governmental and nongovernmental organizations, including the U.S. military,
should continue to prioritize assistance to build capability and strong institutions.
Lessons from the recent past suggest that failure to
support political and societal transition effectively increases the vulnerability of internal instability as well
as regional and international peace. Such instability can further affect U.S. economic and geostrategic
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interests in these countries in transition and beyond.
But the potential impact on future U.S. security interests of continued instability can be mitigated by leveraging and applying U.S. experience in stabilization,
state-building, and institution building, including
security sector reform with the assistance of the U.S.
Army. These security sector reforms, which constitute
an important part of strengthening the new political
regimes, also continue to offer excellent cooperation
and development opportunities to the U.S. Army,
with the potential for establishing and bolstering
long-term beneficial relationships with key regional
security actors.
The U.S. Government, jointly with other international donors, should accelerate public sector human
resource and institutional development in the three
countries, through tailored sustainable capacity building initiatives. The core aim is to equip these societies with future cadre of leaders in a variety of policy
areas to achieve an expeditious transition. Development of skills should be linked simultaneously with
strengthening institutional capabilities—through the
establishment of procedures, systems, and provision
of equipment—to ensure sustainable retaining of
expertise, skills, and knowledge.
Recent events demonstrate that the stability of
Libya is vital for the security of the entire Maghreb
and Sahel, and for the security of U.S. allies on both
shores of the Mediterranean. The U.S. Army can assist other international forces in stabilizing Libya in
order to strengthen confidence among legitimate political factions, and thus contribute to the institutional
development.
Libya needs effective security institutions, including professional and well-equipped armed forces.
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The troubled transition that Libya has experienced
was due in large extent to the absence of an effective
and nonpoliticized security apparatus. In June 2013,
a handful of NATO countries agreed to host Libyan
soldiers for training for a few months. Thus, the U.S.
military with other international allies have an important role to play in training and equipping the Libyan
armed forces far beyond that program so as to foster
enduring security sector reform and stability. Any
such international engagement should be systematic,
comprehensive, and take place on Libyan soil in order
to achieve sustainable results. By contrast, the sporadic engagements of U.S. forces to train and assist
the nascent Libyan armed forces over the last 2 years
remain fruitless and far from achieving the rebuilding
of an effective Libyan military force.
There are significant obstacles to further U.S. involvement in security sector reform and military
training in-country. In addition to the current chaotic
situation in Libya, the United States is challenged by
multiple engagements on other important fronts, and
a potential deficit of political will for further engagement in degraded security environments. However,
this should be balanced against the perception within
the region of a moral obligation on the part of the United States to be involved in stabilization after its (albeit
limited) involvement in operations to remove the previous regime. Put another way, if European and Arab
states were to take on the burden of training and support without U.S. involvement, this would bolster negative perceptions of the United States as an irresponsible and hostile actor, both in Libya and in the region
more broadly. At a bare minimum, the United States
could coordinate international support, assist with
equipping the armed forces, and provide more places
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for Libyan servicemen in U.S. defense training and
education facilities.
Libya also is in need of nonmilitary security rebuilding programs. The U.S. foreign policy and development institutions could increase their engagement
with rebuilding effective police and judicial institutions, as these sectors of statehood are crucial for the
re-establishment of rule of law and strengthening the
credibility of the state in the eyes of its institutions.
In light of increased terrorist threats posed by
domestic and regional radical groups, the Tunisian
and Egyptian security forces are also in need of further U.S. military assistance in order to strengthen
and adapt their existing capabilities to asymmetrical
threats. Prolonging U.S. intelligence sharing agreements, coupled with increased training programs and
the supply of intelligence gathering materials, will reinforce the capability of each country to confront terrorist threats. The Egyptian and Tunisian transitions
remain fragile. A further deterioration of security in
either or both countries will further complicate their
economic recovery and political transition, with likely
instability spillovers beyond their borders.
The struggles of the Arab transition countries cannot entirely be attributed to lack of financial resources.
A deficit of vision among the new leaders and a lack
of capability to comprehend the current challenges
and respond with timely and effective solutions, remain the main handicap to successful transitions. The
United States should support and facilitate the establishment of an institutional capability in the countries
under discussion, comprised of senior officials who
can coordinate and prioritize steps toward achieving
transition goals. A body of this kind would not only
play a coordinating role, but also provide insightful
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advice on how to deal with the challenges that the
respective governments face now and will face in
the future.
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